Andrej Jovićević

I'm a first-year BPhil student at the University of Oxford (Merton College). Previously (2022-25), I completed an undergraduate degree in Philosophy at KU Leuven (Belgium).

My areas of interest and research centre on formal epistemology and metaphysics (modal and higher-order). I most enjoy philosophical work employing formal/mathematical methods.

Publications

• A Semantics for Weak, Question-Sensitive Belief (2025) [Abstract]
Synthese, 206: 165, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-025-05233-x

Recent work in epistemology defends the unorthodox theses that (1) belief is an evidentially weak, (2) question-sensitive attitude, and that (3) rationally permissible belief is sometimes a matter of guessing. These theses fit together naturally to form a unified account of weak, question-sensitive belief. A formal account of weak, question-sensitive belief as a coherent phenomenon is still forthcoming, however. The main aim of this article is to develop a formal account that captures belief’s weakness and question-sensitivity in the setting of epistemic logic. We introduce a class of models in which the points of evaluation are situations, or world-evidence pairs, with evidence understood liberally to include sets of live possibilities, measures of uncertainty, and QUDs. A proposition is believed at a situation just in case it is implied by the most informative probabilistically dominant answer to the QUD, on some way of specifying the threshold of probabilistic dominance. The second aim of the article is to explore two sets of epistemological implications in our formal setting. First, we consider whether beliefs are preserved between situations upon shifting the QUD parameter; specifically, we consider whether beliefs are preserved upon updating with learned information, under refining and coarsening questions, and whether belief is closed under conjunction. Second, we consider the interaction of knowledge and belief; specifically, we consider whether the principles governing the interaction of knowledge and belief in Stalnaker’s KD45 also hold in our setting.

Other Publications

• A Semantics for Weak, Question-Sensitive Belief (2024) [Abstract]
Proceedings of the 24th Amsterdam Colloquium

Recent work in epistemology defends the unorthodox theses that belief is (1) an evidentially weak, and (2) question-sensitive attitude, and (3) that forming beliefs is sometimes a matter of guessing. What motivates these theses are examples of rationally permissible belief-ascriptions that exhibit these traits. The main aim of this paper is to outline a semantic account of categorical and conditional belief-ascriptions that captures the motivating data. We then survey some consequences of the proposed semantics, particularly with respect to the question of whether closure under rules of inference is rationally required for weak, question-sensitive belief.

In Progress

• Explanation is Question-Sensitive [Abstract]
R&R (Email for Draft)

This paper defends the thesis that explanation is question-sensitive. The argument is as follows. Explanation is a pre-theoretic notion, so an adequate theory vindicates (most) pre-theoretic judgments of adequacy about sentences citing reasons why something is the case (e-ascriptions). Since such judgments are themselves question-sensitive, an adequate theory predicts the question-sensitivity of explanation. But then the relation of explanatory dependence itself is question-sensitive. We motivate the claims that (i) explanation is a pre-theoretic notion and (ii) that adequate theories of pre-theoretic notions vindicate (most) pre-theoretic judgments. We also argue that pre-theoretic judgments about explanatory adequacy are sensitive to why-questions. The central example, which straightforwardly generalises and is hence robust, shows that, relative to different questions expressed by one why-interrogative (modulo stress patterns), the same e-ascription may be judged both true and false. After addressing objections, we argue that this conclusion challenges the view that explanatory dependence is entirely ontological or worldly.

• Incomparable, All Dimensions Considered [Abstract]
In Preparation (Email for Draft)

We present a new argument for the incompleteness of individual goodness orderings. Building on the idea that ‘good’ is a multidimensional concept, we model the multidimensionality of individual goodness orderings in a framework akin to that of social choice, where dimensions of goodness play the role of individuals, and the individual goodness ordering the role of the social goodness ordering. Drawing on an analogous result, we show that, given two Pareto principles and a permutation-theoretic constraint, the existence of infinitely many dimensions of goodness entails incomplete- ness. We argue that the background principles and infinitary multidimensionalism are plausible, and thereby motivate incompleteness. Along the way, we explore the meta- physics of dimensions of goodness, discuss the costs of accepting completeness, and offer a principled account of when outcomes are incomparable. We conclude that, de- spite recent arguments to the contrary, incompleteness is theoretically well-motivated and still has a leg to stand on.

Talks

• Incomparable, All Dimensions Considered
Axiology 2025 (McGill University), [Handout]

• Explanation is Question-Sensitive
Explaining Explaining (University of Vienna)

• A Semantics for Weak, Question-Sensitive Belief
24th Amsterdam Colloquium (ILLC, University of Amsterdam), [Poster] BISFORM 2025 (Peking University), [Handout]

• Aboutness and Higher-Order Contingentism [Handout]
Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2024, University of Salzburg (Austria)

• Fictionalism and Counterpossibles [Handout]
Conference on the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgium) 34th Novembertagung on the History and Philosophy of Mathematics